A case in I98I (i) , where the Court of Appeal decided in a wardship action that an operation ought to go ahead to preserve the life of a mongol child, and the cause celebre of 'the Arthur Case' (2) raised an interesting question regarding the conflict which arises between two obviously antithetic views, namely, paternalism (ie, 'the doctor knows best') and the principle of self-determination or autonomy, which in the case of an infant defective, which the cases involved, does not mean the neonate's right to decide but only the negative right of not being dealt with as, and only as, the physician, in his or her judgment, thinks best. Thus, the cases go to the very heart of the i98o Reith lecturer's argument (3) and the criticisms made of his lectures (4 And at this point, as Kennedy rightly asks, and we all must ask, the question is raised: Why should the ethical views of a doctor prevail over society's views? According to the paternalistic model, the doctor's views are superior because he knows best -but he truly only knows his medicine best. As the autonomy of the child means its right not to be dealt with only as the doctor thinks fit, it is thus imperative that society (of which the child is an equal member -as is the doctor) dictate the standards of medical ethical decisionmaking in order to prevent the imposition by the doctor of a paternalist view -and so prevent the infringement of the child's right to self-determination in the negative sense. While the child cannot actually decide, it is much more preferable that society choose than that the choice be made by a few people, whether they be doctors, parents or Nazi eugenicists.
Kennedy As there is always a choice between the moral courses open (for if there were no choice, it would hardly be a question of moral dilemma: there would only be a single answer), there is no necessity that a certain course is the only one which is to be followed. The possession of medical knowledge does not mean that one possesses the key to the only possible course open; for there is no necessary moral conclusion to be deduced from the scientific facts. Now, to return to the idea ofdemocracy, it is a canon of our representative parliamentary democracy, that each man counts equally, so we have a utilitarian approach: a counting of heads. With no particular gift for ethical decisions, society by vote takes the decision.
Ronald Carson said ofKennedy's argument outlined above that he could not see 'how we all would arrive at such a consensus' (7) (my italics). But it must be objected (for Kennedy did not) that Carson is talking about everyone's agreeing. That is an unreasonable stumbling-block: of course, unanimity would be impossible but in our democracy (where unanimity is not required) we would not need universal consensus. Now, having said that society decides, not doctors, there is the last question: What means will impose these standards and maintain them? It is generally believed (8) that the 'heavy hand of legislation' should not be brought to bear mainly because it is an area of opinion. But that is no real objection. All morals are a matter of opinion -and the Suicide Act I96I and Abortion Act I967 are acceptable to most of us. Indeed, it is an illogical proposition that law should not be involved, though the explanation ofwhy people feel this is easy to see. Put simply, people, especially the medical profession, do not want others looking over doctors' shoulders -for that would stifle initiative and shake the confidence of doctors themselves (as Denning, LJ observed (9)); and people do not want doctors hauled before the courts to undergo what Dr Arthur went through.
However, these are unrealistic desires. There are many people who stand to be accused of something illegal for which no guilt can properly be attached to them; but it is part of the democracy in which we live that everyone is at liberty to accuse another. The courts are the guardians of our rights which are guaranteed to us by law; to exclude their jurisdiction would be monstrous -and wrong.
It is all very well to say, as Kennedy 
